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ABSTRACT
Cloaking has long been exploited by spammers for the pur-
pose of increasing the exposure of their websites. In other
words, cloaking has long served as a major malicious tech-
nique in search engine optimization (SEO). Cloaking hides
the true nature of a website by delivering blatantly different
content to users versus web crawlers. Recently, we have
also witnessed a rising trend of employing cloaking in search
engine marketing (SEM). However, detecting cloaking is chal-
lenging. Existing approaches cannot detect IP cloaking and
are not suitable for detecting cloaking in SEM because their
search-and-visit method leads to click fraud. In addition,
they focus on detecting and measuring cloaking on the server
side, but the results are not visible to users to help them
avoid frauds.
Our work focuses on mitigating IP cloaking and SEM
cloaking, and providing client-based real-time cloaking de-
tection services. To achieve these goals, we first propose the
Simhash-based Website Model (SWM), a condensed represen-
tation of websites, which can model natural page dynamics.
Based on SWM, we design and implement Cloaker Catcher,
an accurate, efficient and privacy-preserving system, that
consists of a server that crawls websites visited by users on
demand and a client-side extension that fetches spider views
of websites from the server and compares them with user
views to detect cloaking. Since Cloaker Catcher checks on
the client side for each real user, IP cloaking can be detected
whenever it occurs and click fraud in SEM can also be pre-
vented. Using our system, we conducted the first analysis
of SEM cloaking and found that the main purpose of SEM
cloakers is to provide illicit services.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Today, popular search engines such as Google, Bing and
Yahoo, are the main entries to the information on the Internet
for users. By their abilities to drive web traffic and connect
users with retailers, search engines have changed the adver-
tising history. Search engines monetize their traffic either
via “organic” search results or sponsored search placements -
together comprising a $24B marketing sector [21].
The great value of search engine results has attracted pub-
lic attention, and two major approaches have been applied to
increase website visibility through search engines. The first
approach, Search Engine Optimization (SEO) is the process
of affecting the visibility of a website or a web page in a
search engine’s unpaid results. The second, Search engine
marketing (SEM), 1 refers to the promotion of websites by in-
creasing their visibility through sponsored search placements,
i.e. search ads. Search engine operators encourage the use
of certain techniques such as optimizing content in SEO or
selecting long-tail advertising keywords in SEM. However,
search engines explicitly ban techniques, such as link farms,
keyword stuffing and cloaking, which are specifically designed
to cheat and manipulate rankings. Among these techniques,
cloaking is the basic step for serving non-compliant content.
It has been widely employed to hide the true nature of web-
sites, because of its low setup cost and the lack of effective
and efficient detection methods used against it. While search
operators try to identify and remove pages that host harmful
content (e.g. phishing pages, malware sites, etc.), scammers
seek to elude such detection using cloaking. Typically, a
cloaker serves “benign” content to crawlers and scam con-
tent to normal users who are referred via a particular search
request. An SEM cloaking example is that, a cloaker can
advertise illegal goods or services (e.g. drugs, ghostwriting
service) on sponsored ads, but claim themselves as innocent
ads to search engines. Serving such illicit advertisements
not only put consumers at risk, but also cause high cost to
search operators, e.g. Google paid $500 million to settle a
lawsuit with the U.S. Department of Justice for accepting
advertisements from unlicensed pharmacies [5].
Technical Challenges. Various approaches have been
proposed to detect cloaking sites and measure their preva-
1While search engine marketing can be a broader concept
about marketing related to search engines, this paper refers
to SEM as search advertisements, i.e. sponsored ads on
search engines
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lence. Previous detection studies [26, 24, 7, 14, 8, 23, 17]
focused mainly on using heuristics such as search query mon-
etizability, features in websites such as page size and HTML
tags, to improve detection accuracy. However, these ap-
proaches have three drawbacks. First, they cannot handle IP
cloaking because they fail to use search engine IPs to fetch
spider views and real user IPs to fetch user views. Second,
they are designed for SEO cloaking detection and are not
suitable for SEM cloaking because these methods require
inspectors to pretend to be real users and click on search
results, but doing so in SEM leads to click fraud and breaks
the business model of SEM. Third, their cloaking decisions
are made on the server side and cannot directly protect users.
Our Solution. Instead of leaving all the workload and
decision making to servers, we propose Cloaker Catcher, a
client-based system that detects cloaking on the user side
in real-time. Our system overcomes the three drawbacks
shared by the previous systems. First, since detection is
done on the user side, the system obtains valid user IPs.
Using Google Translate, the system gets search engine IPs.
Therefore, cloakers have no place to hide and IP cloaking
will be detected whenever they occur. Second, since cloaking
decision is made for each user without click fraud, detecting
cloaking in SEM is therefore the same as in SEO. Third, our
system detects cloaking when user clicks the search results or
ads and provides real-time responses to users. Furthermore,
this cloaking signal can be combined with other features such
as DNS domains [15] to improve accuracy or integrated into
existing APIs such as Safe Browsing API [10] to guard users’
browsing sessions.
Apart from differentiating cloaking sites from dynamic
sites, a client-based system has two additional requirements:
(a) since user machines are resource constrained, the system
should introduce low overhead, including both computation
and network traffic, (b) the system should not have access
to the users’ copy of websites, because what user sees is
highly private. In short, we need a cloaking detection system
that is accurate, efficient, privacy-preserving, and minimizes
data transmission. To meet these requirements, this paper
proposes a new way to model website dynamics based on a
locality sensitive hash algorithm, Simhash. We build fuzzy
signatures of contents and the layout for websites. We then
learn patterns, namely, Simhash Website Models (SWM), for
each website and then use them to model the dynamics of
websites. SWM has three significant advantages. They are
compact, easy to compare and accurate in cloaking detection.
We build Cloaker Catcher based on SWM and achieve a
97.1% true positive rate at only a 0.3% false positive rate
with low user overhead.
With Cloaker Catcher, we further conduct a measurement
to understand current state of SEO and SEM cloaking on
Google search. Our results show that cloaking is more popu-
lar in SEO than SEM and the primary goal in SEM cloaking
is to provide illegal service, in contrast to traffic sale in SEO.
Roadmap. The remainder of this paper is structured as
follows. Section 2 provides the necessary background and
challenges, and proposes our solution. Section 3 introduces
Simhash-based Website Models (SWM) and a client-based
detection system based on SWM. Section 4 describes our
data collection process, model training and configuration of
Cloaker Catcher. Section 5 measures the current cloaking
state in SEO and SEM, followed by performance evaluation
of our system and comparison against previous works in
Section 6. Section 7 discusses limitations of our approach.
Section 8 describes related work on search engine spams and
simhash. Section 9 concludes this work.
2. OVERVIEW
Search engines have been the main sources of information
for users since early 21st century. By typing keywords in
search engines, users can get desired information in seconds.
The ability of search engines to direct web traffic created
strong incentives to manipulate the results of Page Rank
algorithms and promote pages in search result listings, and
have attracted wide attention, from both online market and
researchers. Online marketers use various techniques to
promote their ranking in relevant searches, which leads to
higher daily visits and profits. Scammers do the same, except
that they use “blackhat” techniques and try to fool users and
search operators. Researchers and search operators identify
these scammers based on features and penalize their sites.
However, scammers use cloaking as a standard tool to obscure
search engines’ inspection and add significant complexity for
them to differentiate legitimate web content from fraudulent
pages. Our work tackles the cloaking problem and reveal
activities of these scammers.
2.1 Background and Example
Cloaking Types. The key technique of cloaking is to
distinguish users and crawlers. Depending on how users
and crawlers are identified, cloaking techniques are classi-
fied as repeat cloaking, user-agent cloaking, referer cloaking,
Javascript Cloaking, and IP cloaking. In repeat cloaking,
victims are tracked on the user-side via cookies or the server-
side via server log. User-agent cloaking refers to websites
that check the user-agent string in HTTP request to identify
crawlers. Similarly, referer cloaking is done by checking the
referer field to identify users redirected from search engine
sites. Javascript cloaking works by fingerprinting browsers
and serving abusive payload only to real users, rather than
spiders. In IP cloaking, scammers maintain a list of known
crawler IPs or inspectors, such as security companies, and
serve benign content to these them. IP cloaking requires more
work, but is more effective. Crawler IPs are easily available
online and some commercial tools, such as noIPfraud and wp-
Cloaker [25], even periodically update their lists. In practice,
different types of cloaking are usually used in combination,
making them very hard to detect.
Cloaking Example. To concrete the idea of cloaking, we
present one example, a plagiarism service in sponsored ads.
In Figure 7a, a cloaking ad is placed for the term “Essay
Writing”. The cloaker provides users plagiarism service which
is against Google’s ad policy [22], and remains invisible to
search operators. In the background, this website use the
user-agent and referer to distinguish visitors and hide from
inspectors.
2.2 Threat Model
There are multiple entities involved in SEO and SEM
cloaking, including users, search engines and website owners
(advertisers in SEM). Search engines periodically crawl and
index websites and ensure quality of service by considering
various kinds of features in their ranking algorithm. Site
owners want to drive traffic to their sites by ranking high in
search results or ads. Users query terms on search engines
and click on the returned links. As shown in Figure 1, in
Figure 1: Thread Model
cloaking detection, site owners are the attackers and fool both
search engines and users. The attackers craft two versions
of their websites, and send the benign version to search
engines for indexing and ranking, and the malicious version
to users for profit. The spiders cannot see the scam content,
otherwise, search engines or researchers could use other tools
to analyze the page, understand what is being displayed and
flag appropriately. Therefore, in this paper we trust what
spiders see and distrust what users see, and compare spider
views with user views to find attackers.
2.3 Client-based Cloaking Detection
Although many systems [17, 26, 24, 7, 14, 8, 23] have
been proposed to detect cloaking, they share three draw-
backs. First, they cannot detect IP cloaking. This is because
these systems use centralized servers to collect user views,
while scammers and commercial cloaking tools can identify
their servers and send crafted benign content instead of the
illicit ones. Second, most of them are designed for detecting
cloaking in SEO and are not suitable for SEM. The reason
is that these methods require inspectors to pretend to be
real users and click on search results, and the click-through
method in SEM leads to click fraud and breaks the business
model of SEM, where one Pay-Per-Click ad can cost more
than 100$. One exception is Najork’s system [17] which uses
a toolbar to send the signature of user perceived pages to
search engines. But they cannot handle dynamic websites,
and raises high false positive. Third, these systems detect
cloaking on the server side and cannot protect individual
user visits in real-time. Wang et al [23] measured the search
engine response time to cloaking practice and the cloaking
duration of websites. The search engine response time is
defined as the time from cloaking pages show up in top 100
pages for a specific keyword until they are not. The cloaking
duration refers to how long until cloaked pages are no longer
cloaked. Google took around two days to remove more than
50% of the cloaked results for hot search words, and one
week for pharmaceutical words, which are abuse-oriented.
Yahoo took longer. In terms of cloaking duration, over 80%
of these pages remained cloaked after 7 days. This means
many users have visited those websites before search engines
act on cloaking sites. In addition, users may revisit those
sites, because they are previously returned as “trustworthy”
results.
Instead of leaving all the work to search engines, we want
to leverage the fact that cloakers need to reach end users and
catch cloakers on the user side. There are three challenges
in client-based cloaking detection. First and foremost, the
algorithm should be accurate despite presence of dynamic
websites. Second, the system should introduce low overhead
to users, including network traffic and computation. Third,
the system should be privacy preserving. In this paper, we
present Cloaker Catcher, to address the three challenges.
Cloaker Catcher consists of a server which crawls websites
visited by users on demand and a client-side extension which
fetches spider views of websites from the server and compare
them with user views to detect cloaking.
Accuracy. Dynamic nature of websites has been the main
challenge in cloaking detection. Previous works introduce
different sets of features such as statistical summary, words
and HTML tags, and train a fixed threshold for detection.
Similarly, this paper employs Simhash [6] to generate fuzzy
signatures for words and tags on each website and use these
signatures to detect cloaking. Simhash is a special signature
of a feature set. It is a class of Locality Sensitive Hash (LSH)
that has been extensively used in near duplicate detection
in search engines. Simhash is an random projection based
algorithm that maps high dimensional data to fixed bits while
maintaining the property that, hamming distance between
the resulting bits is an estimation of the cosine similarity
between the original feature set. As the signature is fixed bits
(64 in this work), the comparison can be done in O(1). We
train Simhash-based Website Models (SWM) from multiple
spider crawls using hierarchical clustering and compare with
user copies to identify outliers, i.e. cloaking candidates. Our
approach could achieve 97.1% TPR and 0.3 FPR.
Efficiency. Overhead is highly relevant to usability in
client-based systems. In our system, the overhead breaks
down to three parts: fetch server models, extract client
view features and compare the client view with server mod-
els. Similar to previous systems, we use words and tags as
features, which correspond separately to content and struc-
ture of a website. Let NW , NT be number of words and
tags. Server models in our work have constant sizes and
introduce low network traffic to users. Feature extraction
requires a pass through the website where the complexity is
O(NW +NT ). Comparison is expensive and computing the
greatest common feature subsets between websites requires at
least iterating them. Reducing the comparison cost is a well
studied problem in near duplicate detection literatures of in-
formation retrieval. The standard technique is to use locality
sensitive hash to reduce the feature space to fixed bits and
compare these compact representations. Inspired by these
works, Cloaker Catcher work employs Simhash algorithm
to compress feature sets and estimate the distance between
user views and spider views. A comprehensive efficiency
measurement is presented in Section 6.
Privacy. It is privacy-invasive to disclose users’ web views
to servers, because these views may contain sensitive data,
such as name, email address, credit card number etc. Bene-
fiting from compact model representations, Cloaker Catcher
is able to send server views to users and compares on the
client side. The visited URLs of users are sensitive as well
because they can be used to identify users. Luckily, Safe
Browsing API [10] provides a solution to achieve differen-
tial privacy. The basic idea is to receive and send URLs
in batches, which prevents servers from inferring the exact
visited URL. For simplicity reasons, Cloaker Catcher com-
munication uses the visited link and doesn’t implement the
URL privacy protection.
3. SYSTEM DESIGN
Given the challenges and solutions described in Section 2,
we introduce the Simhash-based Website Model to compactly
represent websites and propose Cloaker Catcher based on
SWM.
3.1 Simhash-based Website Model
A website is rendered through Document Object Model
(DOM), which is maintained by browsers as a tree. A DOM
tree contains information about layout of a website (Cas-
cading Style Sheets is supplemental to DOM in describing
the look and formatting of a document). Among different
types of DOM nodes, text nodes represent messages visible to
user and are frequently used in cloaking detection literatures.
This work focuses on structure of DOM tree (tags) and text
nodes that user actually sees. Javascript snippets are not
used, since they are mainly used by websites to handle user
inputs and manipulate DOM trees, which in turn attracts
our attention to the aforementioned features. In order to
model dynamic websites, we propose Simhash-based Web-
site Models, which use clusters learned from multiple spider
copies to quantify average and variance page updates.
3.1.1 Distance Approximation
Simhash [6] is a dimensionality reduction technique. It is
a fuzzy hash function family that maps a high dimension
dataset into fixed bits and preserves the following properties:
(A) the fingerprint of a dataset is a “hash” of its features,
and (B) the hamming distance between two hash values
is an estimation of the cosine similarity θ(~u,~v)/pi between
the original datasets (represented as vector ~u,~v). This is
different from cryptographic hash functions like SHA-1 or
MD5, because they will hash two documents which differs
by single byte into two completely different hash-values and
the hamming distance between them is meaningless.
3.1.2 Computation
The computation of Simhash starts from a set of features.
Given a set of features extracted from a document and their
corresponding weights, we use Simhash to generate an f-bit
fingerprint as follows. We maintain an f-dimensional vector
V, each of whose dimensions is initialized to zero. A feature
is hashed into an f-bit hash value. These f bits (unique to the
feature) increment/decrement the f components of the vector
by the weight of that feature as follows: if the i-th bit of the
hash value is 1, the i-th component of V is incremented by
the weight of that feature; if the i-th bit of the hash value is
0, the i-th component of V is decremented by the weight of
that feature. When all features have been processed, some
components of V are positive while others are negative. The
signs of components determine the corresponding bits of the
final fingerprint. In this work, we set f to 64, which is the
same effective setting for a corpus of 8 billion websites as
described in [16].
There are two characteristics in the computation of the
Simhash. First, the order of the features doesn’t matter
because Simhash is maintaining a global counter V. Second,
size of the feature set should be relatively large, because
Simhash is random projection based approach, a small set
of features may result in completely different Simhash with
one feature difference. These two characteristics can be
indicates that the structural information should be included
in the feature set if the order is important and the number
of features should be relatively large.
3.1.3 Feature Extraction
Figure 2: DOM tree example
In order to model websites and detect cloaking, we need to
capture the behavior and similarity that a website maintains.
We focus on text and tag features, and generate Simhash
values separately. Regarding text features, our algorithm first
extracts the visible sequence of words from websites, and then
extracts words, bi-gram, tri-gram set (repeated elements only
recorded once) from this sequence. For example, the text
features of sentence “i am a cloaker” are {i, am, a, cloaker, i
am, am a, a cloaker, i am a, am a cloaker}. Because there are
usually a large amount of words on a website, and bi-grams
and tri-grams represent structure of documents, Simhash is
suitable for compressing these features.
Similarly, for tags in a DOM tree, we record presence
of each non-text node (tag name), as well as presence of
each child parent pair. The node set records what tag is
present in a page, and child parent pair records how these
tags are organized, i.e., structure information. In practice,
simply recording the presence of tags yields a relatively
small set of features because only a few HTML tags are
frequently used. Therefore, we record both the tag name and
its associated attribute names to gain more features (higher
entropy). Attribute values are discarded because based on
our observation, they may change for each visit, especially
in SEM. A DOM tree example is shown in Figure 2. The
corresponding tag features are {html, head, body, title, . . . ,
(head, html), (body, html), . . . }.
Figure 3 gives an example on how Simhash values for
text and tag features changes along time. These graphs show
changes of www.yahoo.com over 7x24 period from Feb.1, 2015
to Feb.7, 2015. Figure 3a shows text Simhash and Figure 3b
shows tag simhash. The x-axis is bits of the Simhash value
and y-axis is the id of each observation (id increases in
the order of collection time). According to Figure 3, text
Simhash changes rapidly, indicating dynamic nature of yahoo,
and tag Simhash changes less and slower.
3.1.4 Clustering
Websites can have multiple versions of content for many
reasons. An example is the change (expiration) of domain
ownership, where a domain returns completely content all of
a sudden. Since we are monitoring websites over a period of
time, we need to be able to build models for different versions
of websites and learn patterns for each version.
We use agglomerative hierarchical clustering [12] to cluster
the collected Simhash values. It is a bottom up approach:
each observation starts in its own cluster, and pairs of clusters
are merged as one moves up the hierarchy. In order to
decide which clusters should be combined, a measure of
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Figure 3: Yahoo Simhash changes over 7x24 period Feb.1-7, 2015
dissimilarity between sets of observations is required. In most
methods of hierarchical clustering, this is achieved by use of
an appropriate metric (a measure of distance between pairs
of observations), and a linkage criterion which specifies the
dissimilarity of sets as a function of the pairwise distances of
observations in the sets. This work represents each Simhash
as a 64-bit vector and specifies hamming distance as distance
metric. The linkage method used is the average distance and
the linkage criterion is inconsistent coefficient.
Average linkage. Let Sspider = {si, i ∈ (1, n)} be the
Simhash values of n spider views for a website, and suser
be the user view for this website. We use the distance from
suser to centroid of Sspider as a measure of similarity between
suser and Sspider. Consider Simhash values as 64-dimension
vectors, we can compute the centroid Sspider by summing
each dimension of Simhash in the cluster and divide it by
the cluster size.
Inconsistent coefficient. This coefficient characterizes
each link in a cluster tree by comparing its height with the
average height of neighboring links at the same level and
below it in the tree. The higher the value of this coefficient,
the less similar the objects connected by the link. By using
threshold of inconsistency coefficient as criterion, we could
get several clusters for each website.
Equation 1 explains how inconsistent coefficient is com-
puted. α is inconsistent coefficient, d is the distance between
two clusters, µ is mean of the heights of all the links included
in the calculation, σ is standard deviation of these heights.
Each calculation in our system includes all links on the same
level and below it.
α =
d− µ
σ
(1)
Let Tlearn denote the threshold for inconsistent coefficient,
Equation 2 shows the merging criterion in clustering phase.
For leaf nodes, nodes that have no further nodes under them,
the coefficient is set to 0.
Sspidernew = Sspider,r ∪ Sspider,s if α < Tlearn
where α =
dr,s − µ
σ
,
dr,s = d(centroidr, centroids)
µ = avg(x), x ∈ linksr ∪ linkss,
σ = std(x), x ∈ linksr ∪ linkss
Sspider,r = {sr,i, i ∈ (1, nr), centroidr, linksr},
Sspider,s = {ss,j , j ∈ (1, ns), centroids, linkss},
(2)
After hierarchical clustering, Sspider is divided into c clus-
ters Sspider,k, k ∈ (1, c). We denote each cluster Sspider,k with
the centroid and links used in clustering phase Sspider,k =
{centroidk, linksk}. This representation is intended for
comparison with new observations (single node clusters).
centroid is used to compute distance from new observa-
tions to existing clusters, links are used to compute µ and
σ. These compact representations are the Simhash-based
Website Models for this website. By limiting the maximum
number of valid spider copies, SWM can represent websites
in O(1) space.
3.2 Cloaking Detection
For a particular website, we compare what users see on
the client side with models fetched from the server to find
cloaking, i.e. compare suser with Sspider,k, k ∈ (1, c) to find
outliers. In the clustering phase, we use inconsistent coeffi-
cient to test similarity between clusters and decide whether
we should merge two clusters. Since higher inconsistent co-
efficient α indicates dissimilarity, we use the this coefficient
to test outliers as well. Let Tdetect denote the threshold
used to test outliers. Consider the user view suser as a
single node cluster {suser}, and the outlier test is to check
whether {suser} is similar to any of Sspider,k, k ∈ (1, c). If
αk = (dk − uk)/σk > Tdetect, ∀Sspider,k, we consider suser as
an outlier, i.e. cloaking candidate.
However, in reality, there can be consistent differences
between what spiders see and what users see. For example,
a website shows the ad-free version to spiders, but add ads
to the user version. Moreover, there are websites that rarely
changes, meaning standard deviation σ is zero and coefficient
α is undefined. A fixed Tdetect cannot handle such case. To
tolerate errors introduced by the two problems, we introduce
a minimum radius R. The modified formula for detection is
Equation 3:
If dk −R− µk > Tdetectσk, ∀Sspider,k, reject suser (3)
Section 4 implements the proposed SWM and cloaking
detection algorithm, and provides insights and suggestions
on the selection of Tlearn, Tdetect, R.
3.3 Cloaker Catcher
Based on SWM and the cloaking detection algorithm, we
propose Cloaker Catcher, a system consists of server side
crawling and client side detection to combat cloaking. Fig-
ure 4 shows the workflow of Cloaker Catcher. We implement
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Figure 4: Workflow of Cloaker Catcher
the client side as a chrome extension, but it is general to all
modern browsers that supports extension. The server side is
a program that crawl websites and store SWMs in database.
When the client requests for a specific URL, server lookup
the database and send the SWM to the client. The client
side then compares local page content with server models to
find cloaking.
In order to be accurate and efficient, we add several mech-
anisms and modules in the system. (A) On the client side,
cloaking queries are triggered only when users click through
search engine results and ads (currently configured to trigger
on Google search). (B) The navigation URL landed from
search engines are checked against three lists, i.e. a black list,
a white list and a visited list, and is classified immediately if
contained in any of the three. The black list and the white
list contain URLs that are known bad or good. The two lists
are commonly used in other client-based detection literature
[19]. The visited list is unique to our system and it contains
the websites that users have visited before. The visited list is
considered good. This is based on the intuition that, cloakers
will abuse users on the first visit. If a scammer want to make
a sale, he has to show scam content related to the searched
keyword on the first visit, otherwise, users may find this web-
site irrelevant and leave forever. With the help of visited list,
we can reduce number of cloaking queries and reduce false
positives from websites that customize content for individual
users. For instance, websites personalize content for logged
in users (tracked through cookies). We collect the visited
URL list by checking the browsing history and cookies in
users’ browser. (C) If the URL is not in any of the three lists,
the extension sends the URL to the server and gets SWMs
back. The extension computes Simhash values for current
document and compares it with server side SWMs. (D) On
the server side, we maintain a SWM database of the crawled
websites and reply to users’ request with the corresponding
SWM. If the requested URL is not in the database, the server
first returns immediately and start the on-demand crawling
module, which crawls the websites every M hours for N times
(currently, M = 1, N = 5). The on-demand crawling module
can be configured to crawl from Google IPs. This is done by
querying Google Translate [23].
4. IMPLEMENTATION
There are three parameters to be learned in Cloaker Catcher,
the upper bound of inconsistent coefficient in the cluster-
ing phase Tlearn, the lower bound of inconsistent coefficient
Tdetect and the minimum radius R in the detection phase. In
this section, we describe how we collect four different datasets,
two for SEO and the other two for SEM, and how we get the
groundtruth. The groundtruth is used to train and select
parameters. The four different datasets are used to measure
current cloaking state in SEO and SEM in Section 5.
4.1 Dataset
Popular words in SEO and SEM are different. Because
high search volume doesn’t directly imply high ad value.
Therefore, we collect keywords and landing pages for SEO
and SEM separately.
4.1.1 Keywords
SEO. Similar to Wang et al. [23], in order to detect
and measure cloaking that intended to gather high vol-
umes of undifferentiated traffic, and those target on specific
cloak search terms, we collect two set of words, hot search
words Whot,search and abuse oriented words Wspam,search.
Whot,search consists of 170 unique monthly hot search words
from Google trend [1] from Jan 2013 to Dec 2014. Wspam,search
is first manually collected by referring to Google’s search and
ad policy for basic abuse oriented words in search engine. The
abuse categories include gaming ad network, adult-oriented
content, alcoholic beverages, dangerous products, dishonest
behavior, gambling-related content, healthcare and medicines.
We then expand it using Google Suggest, and get 1024 words
as Wspam,search .
SEM. Popular search words doesn’t imply high ad value.
For example, navigational keywords, such as facebook, have
low ad value, because users just want to navigate to face-
book.com instead of going anywhere else or buying anything.
Therefore, we collect monetizable words for SEM related data
collection. We measure monetizability of words by query-
ing Google Keyword Planner (GKP) [3]. GKP provides
convenient API for checking competition 2 and suggests bid
price for keywords. In SEM, we collect two sets of keywords,
trending and abuse-oriented ones. The former is obtained by
using GKP to filter a large set of hot keywords, i.e. 31679,
from Google Trend [1] and select words that have more than
1k monthly search, greater than 0.1 competition and higher
than 0.1$ suggested bid price. As a result, we get 11622
keywords as Whot,ad. The abuse-oriented set, denoted by
Wspam,ad, is obtained by removing words that has no compe-
tition and no bid price in Wspam,search. Wspam,ad ends up
with 573 words.
4.1.2 Crawling
Starting from the four collected keyword sets, we auto-
mate browsers to do search-and-click tasks. This work uses
Selenium [20], an open source browser automation tool, to
visit websites while mimicked as users and spiders. We use
Selenium to automate a JS-supported browser for two rea-
sons: detect Javascript based cloaking and increase coverage
3
When dealing with SEO keywords, we set browser user-
agent as
“Googlebot/2.1 (+http://www.google.com/bot.html)”
to mimic Google bot and
“Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36
(KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/37.0.2049.0 Safari/537.36”
2Competition is a [0,1] scale measure, 0 means nobody bids
for it and 1 indicates high bidding competition.
3In our early experiments, around 20% of advertisements
have Javascript redirection and cannot be retrieved by tools
with no JS support, such as wget and curl.
to mimic Chrome users on Windows machine. For SEM
keywords, settings for users are the same, but the bot user-
agent is set as
“AdsBot-Google (+http://www.google.com/adsbot.html)”
to mimic Google ads bot. AdsBot is used by Google to
inspect ads, and it is required by Adwords Policy [22] that
landing pages should show consistent content to AdsBot and
normal users.
In SEO and SEM, we use multiple IPs to visit and crawl
websites because we get blocked frequently by Google and
changing IP enables us to continuously do search-and-visits.
Similar to previous works, we don’t attempt to get Google
IP or real users in data collection and we might miss cloakers
that employs IP cloaking in our measurement. However,
this doesn’t affect our model training because it is trained
generally for differentiating dynamic websites against cloak-
ing ones. Our crawling process is: (A) For each word in
Whot,search, Wspam,search, Whot,ad, Wspam,ad, we search in
Google and click on results in first 20 pages (top 200) or
ads in first 5 pages as normal user. We save landing URLs
URLlanding,user and web pages to disk. (B) For landing
URLs collected in step (A), we directly visit them 6 times
(because we need multiple spider copies to learn clusters) as
Googlebot or AdsBot and save website content to disk. This
gives us separate dataset for the four keyword sets, denoted
as Dspam,search, Dhot,serch, Dspam,ad and Dhot,ad.
4.1.3 Preprocessing
The obtained four data sets in the crawling phase. Since we
want to model website on a per URL basis and parameters in
URL may change for every visit, it is necessary to define the
granularity of comparison, i.e. what is a unique URL. For ex-
ample, ad campaign information are encoded as parameters
in GET requests, and is different every time, making it diffi-
cult to compare based on full URL. Therefore, we preprocess
the URLs by (1) Strip URL parameter values (2) Keep param-
eter names, (3) Discard scheme (4) Remove fragments. For
instance, http://www.example.com/?user=value#fragment is
simplified to www.example.com/?user. The resulting strings
are used as unique identifiers for URLs. After preprocessing,
Dspam,search consists of 129393 unique URLs, Dhot,search
has 25533, Dspam,ad has 2219, and Dhot,ad has 25209.
4.
4.2 Groundtruth
We collect groundtruth semi-automatically. Starting from
Dhot,search and Dspam,search, we first remove duplicates
(same signature between user views and Google views), be-
cause they are not helpful for training of SWM which is
designed to handle dynamics of websites. Next, we ran-
domly sample and manually label remained websites from
Dhot,search and Dspam,search using heuristics such as domain
reputation [2]. It is important to notice that, although the
labeling process uses URL reputation information (highly
reputed domains are less likely to do cloaking), it is orthog-
onal to the algorithm’s capability, because the algorithm
only measures difference of text and tag features between the
original documents. Through the massive labeling process,
we flagged 1195 cloaking examples. In terms of normal web-
sites, we randomly select 5308 samples from the non-cloaking
dataset. The two parts, 6503 URLs in total, are combined as
4Automating website visits through selenium and chrome
sometimes results in incomplete rendering or empty content,
these examples are removed from collected dataset
groundtruth Dg for training and evaluation. The websites in
Dg are converted to Simhash values Sg,text and Sg,tag using
the feature extraction and dimension reduction technique
(Simhash) described in Section 3.1.
4.3 Model Training
Figure 5: ROC for detection based on individual
features and combination of them
Tlearn and Tdetect are used to generate an adaptive thresh-
old for each website and R is to make system robust to
consistent difference between spider and user copies. Based
on labeled dataset Dg, our target is to learn the three pa-
rameters. Since R is parameter unrelated to page dynamics,
we first select optimal Tlearn and Tdetect, and then evaluate
our algorithm for different settings of R.
Because R is a parameter to allow the system to handle
consistent difference between spider and user copies, we
first set R to be zero, and do a five-fold stratified cross
validation using Scikit-learn [18] on Dg. In the learning
phase, our objective function is to minimize the total number
of classification errors. If the total numbers are the same,
we select the one with minimal d = Tdetect − Tlearn since d
represents the range of coefficients that are neither similar
nor dissimilar. After the five-fold stratified cross validation
process using the described objective function on Sg,tag and
Sg,text for optimal parameter selection, we find the optimal
parameters: Tdetect,tag = 1.8, Tlearn,tag = 0.7, Tdetect,text =
2.1 and Tlearn,text = 0.7.
Similarly, Rtext and Rtag are decided separately. In this
section, we conduct three experiments using different features:
(1) tag only (2) text only (3) combination of text and tag
features. We apply five-fold stratified cross validation and
the same objective function to learn and test Sg,tag and
Sg,text. The optimal parameter for tag Simhash is Rtag = 17,
text Simhash is Rtext = 16. Cross and oval marked lines in
Figure 5 shows the ROC curve for Rtag and Rtext. Next, in
order to show the combined performance for tag and text
features, we set Rtext to 15 and 17 separately and change
Rdom as shown in dotted lines in Figure 5.
It is straightforward that combining tag and text signature
improves performance. The learned parameters are used
in Section 5 to detect and measure cloaking on the four
datasets, and is set to Rtext = 15 and Rtag = 13, Tdetect,tag =
1.8, Tlearn,tag = 0.7, Tdetect,text = 2.1 and Tlearn,text =
0.7, which corresponds to 0.3% FPR and 97.1% TPR. It
is important to notice that, 0.3% FPR is the result on our
Table 1: Cloaking Distribution
Category
Traffic Sale
PPC Error IS Phishing PD Malware Total
Pharmacy Gamble Loan TS
Spammy Search 26.5% 60.8% 1.3% 1.1% 1.1% 1.7% 4.9% 0.7% 2.9% 0.8% 2491
Hot Search 35.5% 2.2% 30.1% 29.0% 0 2.2% 2.2% 0 3.2% 0 93
Spammy Ads 0 0 0 0 14% 0 86% 0 0 0 7
Hot Ads 0 0 0 35% 0 0 65% 0 0 0 17
TS: Other Traffic Sale, PPC: Pay-Per-Click, IS: Illegal Service, PD: Parking Domain
reduced dataset, which is obtained by removing websites that
have doesn’t change content or structure (tags) based on
visitors. If we consider the whole dataset, our false positive
rate is much lower than 0.3%FPR. The selected parameters
are also used to configure Cloaker Catcher and preliminary
feedbacks from several users show that our system is effective
in detecting both SEO and SEM cloaking.
5. MEASUREMENT
5.1 Terminologies
We detected and measured cloaking in four collected datasets:
spammy search, Dspam,search, hot search, Dhot,search, spammy
ads, Dspam,ad, hot ads, Dhot,ad. Based on summarization of
SEO cloaking types in [23] and our observations of SEM
cloaking, we categorized cloaking into seven types: Traf-
fic Sale, Pay-Per-Click (PPC), Error Page, Illegal Service,
Phishing, Parking Domain, and Malware. To better analyze
cloaking incentives, we further divided traffic sale into four
categories: pharmacy, gambling, loan, and general traffic sale.
Traffic sale sites are usually from third parties and include
iframe pointing target sites for traffic monetization. PPC
means that landing page host pay-per-click advertisements.
Error Page refers to websites that deliver erroneous infor-
mation. Illegal Service includes websites that provide illicit
services such as drugs, essay writing, copyrighted content,
and bot service. Parking Domain are domains that redirect
users to unwanted download, but not necessarily malicious.
5.2 Sumamry of Findings
We measured the cloaking state of hot and abuse-oriented
words in the four collected datasets separately. After manu-
ally inspection of websites related to abuse-oriented words,
we found that 2% of the search results and 0.32% of the ads
are cloaking. For hot words, 0.36% of the search results and
0.07% of the ads are cloaking. An interesting finding is that
the SEO cloaking sites mainly targets traffic sale, while the
SEM cloaking websites provide illegal services.
In Dspam,search, we apply our cloaking detection system
on 129393 websites. We manually label the detected results
and identify 2491 cloaking websites. We further analyzed
incentives of cloaking websites and show the results in Ta-
ble 1. The majority of these websites fall into traffic sale.
In total, websites related to phishing, parking domain and
malware sums to 110, a non-negligible amount missed by
Google because of cloaking. In Dhot,search, we found 93
cloaking websites. Among these sites, pharmacy, loan and
general traffic sale are prevalent categories. After combining
observations of Dspam,search and Dhot,search, we concluded
that the main goal of SEO cloaking is to achieve traffic sale.
In spammy ads Dspam,ad, we processed 2219 websites and
identified 7 cloaking websites. 6 of them provides illegal
service. In Dhot,ad, we checked 25209 websites and found
17 cloaking websites. 11 of them provides promoting illegal
services and 6 provides traffic sale.
6. PERFORMANCE
Generally, there are mainly two phases in cloaking de-
tection literatures: feature extraction and comparison. In
the feature extraction phase, these algorithms traverse the
web pages and extract statistical and semantic features. In
the comparison phase, the algorithms compare the features
extracted from both user copies and spider copies to identify
cloaking. In this section, we present a taxonomy of cloaking
detection methods then explain differences between Cloaker
Catcher and other cloaking detection works. Since our goal
is to design a client-based detection system in which perfor-
mance matters, we re-design previous works as client-based
systems similar to Cloaker Catcher and compare time com-
plexity and storage of our system with them to show that
our system is a better fit for client-based cloaking detec-
tion. Secondly, we measure the computation and comparison
performance using real world examples and show that the
average delay is around 100 milliseconds.
6.1 Efficiency Comparison
We provide a taxonomy of cloaking detection methods
based on Lin’s summary in his tag-based system [14]. Ta-
ble 2 shows the comparison between Cloaker Catcher and
previous systems along six dimensions, features, max f1-score,
IP/SEM cloaking, feature extraction time, amount of data
transmitted, and comparison time.
The“features”dimension specifies what features from a web
page are used for cloaking detection. Possible features are
terms and tags, because an HTML web page comprises these
three types of elements (Javascript, CSS etc. are included
files). These elements are usually used in combination to
reduce false positive.
The “max F1-score” dimension is summarized empirically
based on comparison presented in [14] and [8]. Since the two
works compare the precision and recall of these algorithms, we
use F1-score, i.e. F1 = 2·precision·recall/(precision+recall)
to summarize them. Generally, the higher the F1-score, the
better the system. Najork’s work [17] uses cryptographic
hash functions to fingerprint a website and have high false
positive because they can not handle dynamic website. Rela-
tive F1 scores for [27, 26, 7, 14] are directly inferred from
[14]. TagDiff [14], Dagger [23] and our system, Cloaker
Catcher, use the same types of features, and achieves similar
F1-score. Hybrid Detection [8] adds links to the feature set,
and achieves slightly better results. Although adding links
may improve the performance of our system, we skip it for
Table 2: Comparison of cloaking detection methods
Methods Features Max F1 Score IP/SEM Extraction Time Data Transmitted Comparison Time
Najork [17] W, L, T low 3 O(NW +NL +NT ) O(1) O(1)
Term & Link Diff [27] W, L medium 7 O(NW +NL) O(NW +NL) O(NW +NL)
Wu & Davison [26] W, L medium 7 O(NW +NL) O(NW +NL) O(NW +NL)
CloakingScore [7] W medium 7 O(NW ) O(NW ) O(NW )
TagDiff [14] W, T high 7 O(NW +NT ) O(NW +NT ) O(NW +NT )
Dagger [23] W, T high 7 O(NW +NT ) O(NT ) O(NT )
Hybrid Detection [8] W, L, T high 7 O(NW +NL +NT ) O(NL +NT ) O(NL +N
2
T )
Cloaker Catcher W, L, T high 3 O(NW +NT ) O(1) O(1)
W : words, T : tags, L: links
now because on one hand links are not suitable for Simhash
algorithm, and on the other hand directly comparing link
sets introduces too much overhead.
The “IP/SEM” dimension specifies whether the original
system is capable of detecting IP cloaking and SEM cloaking.
Cloaker Catcher and Najork’s system [17] are the only
systems capable of detecting them since they are client-based.
However, the poor precision of the latter prevents its usage.
The “Extraction Time”, “Data Transmitted” and “Com-
parison Time” columns are not trivial because some of the
original systems are not designed for client-based detection.
To make these systems comparable to our system, we modify
the previous works in a client-server way: (1) The server
caches the features for a large amount of websites and re-
sponds to client requests with features for the requested URL
(2) The clients request features for the current URL from the
server, extract features from the client copy and compare
the two sets of features to identify cloaking. This design
guarantees that the server could get no more information
than the URLs, which we can further use techniques em-
ployed in existing APIs such as SafeBrowsing API [10] to
reduce user linkability. The time and data requirements are
shown using number of terms, tags and links. As shown
in the “Data Transmitted” column, Cloaker Catcher bene-
fits from compact website models and transfers much less
data compared to Dagger [23] and Hybrid Detection [8].
This is important in client-based detection because network
delay is unpredictable. In terms of “Extraction Time” and
“Comparison Time”, the most similar system, Dagger uses
text shingling to reduce number of term comparison, but
they still do pairwise comparison of tags. In order to detect
cloaking on the client side, their clients need to traverse the
document in O(NW +NT ) time to extract features, request
O(NT ) features including fixed number of shingles and all the
tags from the server and compare these features in O(NT ).
Cloaker Catcher, in contrast, uses fixed size features and
compares much faster.
6.2 Performance of Cloaker Catcher
As described in Figure 4, Cloaker Catcher detects cloak-
ing in several steps, in order to minimize number of server
queries and detection overhead. First, it only examines the
websites that are visited through Google search (this step
can be generalized to crawler user agent of other search op-
erators). Secondly, these websites are checked against three
lists (black/white/visited). When the websites are not in
these lists, the system requests spider copies and compares
with user copies. The main delay in the detection consists
of three parts, feature extraction, data transfer, and com-
parison. Since data transfer time depends on the network
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Figure 6: Extraction and Comparison Overhead in-
troduced by Cloaker Catcher
status and is irrelevant to the web page size, we only measure
the feature extraction and comparison overhead. We ran-
domly select 2,000 URLs from our SWM database and use
selenium to automate Chrome with Cloaker Catcher to visit
these websites. We record the feature extraction time and
comparison time and aggregate them by web page size. The
results are shown in Figure 6, x-axis is the web page size in
log scale and y-axis is the time cost. The graph show solid
points which are average time, along with their upper and
lower error bar. When the web page size are greater than
1KB, feature extraction time grows linearly and comparison
remains constant. The curves fluctuate when page size is less
than 1KB because of few sampled websites. The overall delay
introduced by Cloaker Catcher are hundreds of milliseconds
in practice.
7. LIMITATION
URL Features. URLs on a website show navigational
features of websites, e.g. embedded links to images or videos.
However, URL features are not straightforward and require
further study to compactly represent them. We leave this
for future work and anticipate a more robust client-based
system with URL features.
Incentive analysis automation. We manually classified
the incentives of cloaking websites in this work. However,
according to our observations, this process can be automated
using machine learning approaches. For example, cloaking
sites that simply embed an iframe is targeting traffic sale, and
ones that redirects users to downloads are doing unwanted
software download.
SWM Availability. Cloaker Catcher includes a server
that crawls websites on demand and builds SWM. However,
this can be a huge amount of work as the number of users
increases. Therefore, we advise search engines to adopt
our prototype and detect cloaking at scale. For individual
researchers, a trade-off is to selectively crawl websites and
reply SWMs for them. For instance, researchers can disable
the on-demand crawling module and crawl URLs for specific
categories of words. Researchers can also filter the requested
URLs based on domain reputation [2] and only crawl the
suspicious ones.
8. RELATED WORK
Simhash. Simhash is a popular Locality Sensitive Hash
(LSH) used in information retrieval. In the field of near
duplicate detection, Minhash [4] and Simhash [6] are the
most popular techniques. A large scale study [9] has been
done to evaluate the two algorithms. A great advantage of
using Simhash over Minhash is that it requires relatively
small-sized fingerprints. For example, 24 bytes Minhash
and 64-bit Simhash achieves similar performance. David
et al. [23] employs shingling (Minhash) and our system use
Simhash to gain a more compact representation of websites.
Semantic Features. Previous works on cloaking detec-
tion focus on differentiating dynamic pages from blatantly
different content. Various ways to measure similarity of
documents are proposed. A similar toolbar based approach
is proposed by Najork et al. [17]. The toolbar sends the
signature of user perceived pages to search engines. But they
cannot handle dynamic websites, and may raise high false
positive. Wu et al. [26] used statistics of web pages to detect
cloaking and Chellapilla et al. [7] detected syntactic cloaking
on popular and monetizable search terms. They showed that
search terms with higher monetizability had more cloaked
links than popular terms. Referrer cloaking was first studied
by [24]. They found a large number of referrer cloaking pages
in their work. Lin et al. [14] introduced tag based methods for
cloaking detection, [23] extended previous efforts to measure
dynamics of cloaking over five months. They used text-based
method and tag-based method to detect cloaking pages. [8]
integrated previous efforts and proposed a text, link and tag
based cloaking detection system. Inspired by previous works,
we use texts, links and tags to model a website. We further
compress the three feature sets to fixed-bits using Simhash
and reduce complexity of pairwise comparison to O(1).
Domain Features. Domain and content features are
orthogonal and both contain information about a particular
website. Lu et al. [15] and John et al. [11] have used domain-
related information, e.g. redirection and domain reputation,
to detect search engine poisoning. A more thorough and long-
term study of search engine poisoning is done by Leontiadis
et al. [13]. Content-based detection and domain-based
detection complement each other and may work better if
combined.
9. CONCLUSION
Detection of search engine spam and ad spam is a chal-
lenging research area. Cloaking has become a standard tool
in the spammer’s toolbox and added significant complexity
for detection. Our work has identified previous cloaking
works’ inability in detecting IP-based cloaking and SEM
cloaking and proposed a novel client-based system, Cloaker
Catcher, to address these issues. The key component of
Cloaker Catcher is the compact website model, SWM, which
minimizes the storage for each website and enables fast com-
parison between user views and spider views. We further
use Cloaker Catcher to detect and classify cloaking in col-
lected search results and ads. We present the first analysis
of cloaking in search ads, which shows that, the purpose of
advertisement cloakers is mainly to provide illicit services,
different from search cloakers who mainly want to monetize
their traffic.
Given the high accuracy and low overhead of this approach,
we believe Cloaker Catcher is a practical system for search
engines to provide real-time protection for users. The cloak-
ing detection can serve as a separate warning or be integrated
into existing API to improve users’ experience.
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APPENDIX
A. SEM CLOAKING EXAMPLE
(a) Search on Google: Essary Writing
(b) Click-through users are presented plagiarism service
(c) Spiders are presented hotel page
Figure 7: SEM Cloaking in sponsored ads of “essay
writing”
Figure 7 shows an SEM cloaking example of keyword
“essay writing”. The search result page, user view and spider
view are listed.
